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Do Dollar Forecasters Believe too Much in PPP?
1. Introduction
Since about 20 years we know that exchange rate forecasts of professionals 
show some degree of "irrationality" (Dominguez, 1986, p.281). It has become a styl-
ized fact that these forecasts do not hold predictive power and that forecasters do not 
even use the entire information available (surveys by Takagi, 1991, Sarno and Taylor, 
2002). Too little is known about possible sources of this pattern. Our research con-
tributes towards a better understanding of this seemingly "irrational" behavior by us-
ing a new database. This enables us to analyze monthly US-Dollar/Euro and US-
Dollar/Deutsche Mark forecasts for more than 12 years, i.e. significantly longer than 
earlier studies. Additionally and for the first time on this literature, the forecasts of 
professionals are examined in groups defined by their relative reliance on fundamen-
tal analysis. We determin  that forecasters in general rely too much on mean rever-
sion on exchange rates, mean represented by purchasing power parity (PPP). The 
revealing fact is that fundamentalists show even more biased forecasts – this is con-
sistent to the opinion that Dollar forecasters believe too much in PPP.
Right from its beginning the thorough analysis of exchange rate expectations 
have been motivated under the issue of market efficiency. The Frankel and Froot 
(1987a) "finding of systematic expectational errors" (p.150) set the ball to roll and 
was confirmed by numerous authors and various samples (see MacDonald, 2000). 
The many repetitions of the early results might have been responsible for the fact 
that a caveat has been readily neglected so far: Frankel and Froot (1987a) reveal 
systematic errors but they also report that the sign of the error may depend on the 
sample period. This puts into question, whether deeper forces at work appear that 
may play a responsible part upon the changing sign. An analysis of this issue re-
quires longer time series exceeding the often used two to four years.
Another important issue already addressed by Frankel and Froot (1990) is the 
forecast heterogeneity. Earlier studies, such as Dominguez (1986) or Frankel and 
Froot (1987a, 1987b), are based on consensus forecasts. More recent studies 
though analyze individual expectation data to reveal indeed different pattern in fore-
casts (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2003). This line of work describes and examines 
heterogeneity but does not allow inferences on possible sources of heterogeneity. 
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For the latter purpose one would need additional, exogenous information (see, 
Moosa and Shamsuddin, 2004, p. 1606). A rare example is shown in the analysis of 
the exchange rate forecasts of commercial services (Goodman, 1979), where techni-
cally-oriented services perform better than economics-oriented services. However, 
the data spans less than three years and considers only 13 forecasting services. An-
other example is the examination of a relatively short Japanese sample which allows 
classification of six groups, such as exporters etc. This data indicates that expecta-
tions can be affected by private information (Wakita, 1989) but is also influenced by 
wishful thinking (Ito, 1990). It is again Frankel and Froot (1990) who suggest another 
cut in the data that might be warranted: they speculate that there may be forecasters 
"who think long-term" and consequently form regressive expectations then again oth-
ers "who think short-term" form rather static expectations. We know that profession-
als picture expectations differently, though we need a rationale for this behavior –
such as the one suggested by Frankel and Froot – provided that we want to reach 
beyond description and build an economic understanding instead.
We read the suggestion of long-term motivated regressive exchange rate ex-
pectations as a hint towards the possible importance of PPP. PPP is a core part in 
many exchange rate models, it is an intuitively plausible benchmark for thinking 
about exchange rates and – most important – it has received credit as an empirically 
valid concept as surveyed by Rogoff (1996) or Taylor and Taylor (2004). To pinpoint 
it further: as there is no single exchange rate theory that holds empirically (Frankel 
and Rose, 1995, Sarno and Taylor, 2002), which economic concept forecasters 
ought to be used if not PPP? 
An examination of this issue would therefore profit from data that fulfils two con-
ditions: the time series should be long and there should be information indicating that 
the economic concept of PPP drives expectations. The long period is needed in order 
to cover exchange rate movements to and from PPP. Additional information towards 
motivation of forecasters is useful to derive directly the importance of PPP. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no data set in the literature that would fulfil these two 
conditions except for the data used here.
We show that professionals from Germany, covering more than the past 12 
years, behave very conventionally: our first result shows that according to standard 
surveys their expectations are not purely rational and they seem to apply different 
kinds of expectation formation. As this is in unison to the literature, we declare it as 
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5
indication that other results derived from our data can be generalized too. Second, 
biases in expectations are identified in the consensus forecasts, as professionals 
significantly belief too much in mean reversion, mean being represented by PPP. 
Third, according to their reliance on fundamental analysis and as soon as the sample 
is divided into three groups, the forecasters who rely most strongly on fundamentals 
analysis – "fundamentalists" – reveal an even stronger bias. The group who relies the 
least on fundamentals – prefer technical analysis instead: "technicians" – shows a 
much smaller bias. So, stronger belief in fundamentals and thus PPP is revealed as a 
source of bad forecasting performance. Fourth, though, the technicians' "advantage" 
in this respect is compensated by another bias not unexpected for technicians, show-
ing too much expectation of trend extrapolation. Fifth, we illustrate, that forecasting 
biases of fundamentalists and technicians will get stronger when the exchange rate is 
further away from PPP. Finally, ‘point forecasts' performance of both groups is of 
similar poor quality. Interestingly, all groups distinguished show some directional 
forecasting ability.
The remainder is structured as follows. Section 2 describes data, whereas re-
sults are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
Our expectation data is based upon the ZEW Financial Market Survey. The 
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) of Mannheim (Germany) collects 
every month numerous economic and financial forecasts with a horizon of six months. 
The ZEW survey is a qualitative questionnaire, which has been driven since Decem-
ber 1991 and soon grew up to a stable panel with more than 300 participants in 
Germany. Around 75 per cent of the participants work in the banking sector (as ana-
lysts, fund managers etc.) and 25 per cent work either in the insurance or in the in-
dustrial sector.1 In comparison to other surveys the amount of participants is relative 
large and its composition according to their profession is similar to others (Consen-
sus forecasts, London, contain 75 per cent participants from financial institutions). 
The forecasts collected are standardized by fax and are usually processed on the 
last Friday of each month.
1
 The ZEW publishes out of the ZEW Financial Market Survey regularly amongst others the 
ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, which is a leading indicator for the German economy 
and of similar prominence like the ifo Index.
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Our dataset contains the individual six months exchange rate forecasts of the 
US-Dollar/Euro (respectively the US-Dollar/Deutsche Mark) from December 1991 to 
April 2004 and sums up to a total of 149 surveys. To our knowledge no other study 
uses a panel of monthly exchange rate expectations with a dataset as long as ours.2
Additionally we use daily US-Dollar/Euro and US-Dollar/Deutsche Mark rates from 
the Deutsche Bundesbank, six month Libor rates from EcoWin and price index data 
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).
We are aware about criticism regarding the use of survey data for modelling ex-
pectations in general and for financial forecasts in particular. Nevertheless, incentives 
for participants not to reveal their true beliefs are very limited as the ZEW publishes 
the aggregated forecasts (consensus forecasts) only. Moreover manipulating the 
data with extreme forecasts is practically impossible, due to around 300 participants 
and the qualitative responses given. Additionally the incentive to participate at the 
survey in order to get an extensive summary of the consensus data with additional 
background information from the ZEW directly seems to be quite strong as this data 
is well covered by the financial media.
To get a first impression of the exchange rate forecasts, some descriptive statis-
tics are presented in Table 1. For comparison we include the corresponding six 
month forward rates and the realized exchange rates at the same time. With respect 
to the level statistics one recognizes that consensus forecasts as well as forward 
rates behave similar to realized exchange rates though forward rates resemble ex-
change rates even better. If one looks at the change statistics, consensus forecasts 
still behave similar to realized exchange rates, in contrary to forward rates which dif-
fer especially on their variability measures. Finally the consensus expects a slightly 
stronger US-Dollar on average towards the Euro whereas the US-Dollar actually 
weakens on average.
Additionally in a specific survey ZEW participants were asked on which informa-
tion they actually base their exchange rate forecasts (see ZEW Financial Market Re-
port, 2004).3 This enables us to categorize the participants according to their use of 
2
 Recently Stadtmann (2004) uses the Wall Street Journal survey which covers a longer time 
period (1989 – 2003), but at the cost of semi yearly data only, which generates just 30 data 
points.
3
 Participants were asked to distribute 100 points amongst the categories fundamental, tech-
nical and flow analysis according to the way how they do their exchange rate analysis.
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analytical instruments. We base our classification on the use of fundamental analysis 
and organize the survey participants in fundamentalists, technicians and intermedi-
ates. We could not find any significant difference between people who use primarily 
technical analysis or flow analysis due to the fact, that flow analysis is used to a 
much smaller degree than other instruments of analysis (the average share of flow 
analysis in the forecasting process sums up to 10 per cent, whereas technical analy-
sis adds up to 30 per cent and fundamental analysis to 60 per cent).4 The respective 
outcome of this questionnaire is summarized in Table 2. One can see that the group 
of fundamentalists is about as big as the group of technicians, due to the threshold 
values being chosen. The average numbers of these two groups representing more 
than 35 seem big enough for our analysis.5
3. Results
In the following regression analysis we use OLS estimators corrected for 
Newey-West standard-errors (see, Newey and West, 1987). We choose five lags as 
a result of the overlapping problem attributed to monthly forecasts with a six month 
forecast horizon, which imparts a fifth order moving average error process (see, for 
example Hansen and Hodrick, 1980). In addition and owing to the qualitative nature 
of the expectation data we use the quantification technique from Carlson and Parkin 
(1975) to generate point forecasts.6 Due to non-stationarity characteristics of the time 
series, we use change forecasts rather than point forecasts. Detailed descriptions of 
the calculations and analyzed variables are given in each of the attached tables.
3.1. Rationality of expectations
In order to check characteristics of our survey participants with well established 
results in the literature, we perform conventional tests of forecast rationality. Since 
4
 This could be connected to the panel composition, i.e. analysts being more represented 
than traders. We know that traders rely significantly more than others on flow analysis (see 
Gehrig and Menkhoff, 2005). The high representation of technical analysis seems very plau-
sible, however, as it is known that fund managers – which are represented here too – heavily 
rely on technical investment strategies, such as momentum trading (Menkhoff and Schmidt, 
2005).
5
 This average number of responses reflects the fact that we include only those observations 
in the sample where the person responding to the "use of information-question" does not 
change during time. Therefore, it seems almost unavoidable that the sample becomes 
smaller the more we go back into history.
6
 Taylor (1989), among others, also uses this method to quantify categorical responses.
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8
Dominguez (1986) and for this purpose primarily it is common to check the degree of 
unbiasedness as well as efficiency. 
Test of unbiasedness: ett ss 66 ++ +=  (1)
Test of efficiency: 666 +++ += ttet FDss  (2)
The unbiasedness test is modelled in equation (1), where the change of the ex-
change rate (s
 t+6) is regressed on the corresponding expectation change (se t+6). 
To satisfy the postulate of rationality, the estimated value of  has to be one, whereas 
 needs to be zero. Additionally in equation (2) the difference of the expected ex-
change rate change and the actual change is regressed on the six months forward 
rate premium (FD
 t+6). To confirm efficiency and rationality of the expectations, it is 
required that  as well as  are both zero.
Table 3 presents results on the test of unbiasedness which reject the hypothe-
sis of rational expectations, because  is significantly below unity. Furthermore the 
test of orthogonality shows evidence of irrationality too, since  is significantly above 
null which implies that even data easily available such as the forward premium is not 
completely processed in exchange rate forecasts.7 All in all, the unbiased expecta-
tions hypothesis (and therefore the assumption of rationality) on consensus forecasts 
has to be rejected, being well in-line with the literature (e.g. Kim, 1997, MacDonald, 
2000).
3.2. Bias of expectations
However, our primary interest lies on the sources for the irrationality of FX-
forecasts. To reveal the kind of forecast pattern we estimate a hybrid model. Since 
the work by Frankel and Froot (1987a) a lot of analyses have been carried out to es-
timate the expectation formation for exchange rates, i.e. extrapolative, adaptive, re-
gressive expectations and some sort of mixed models on former (see e.g. Cavaglia 
et al., 1993, Ito, 1994, Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2003). Summarizing it figures out that 
depending on the forecast horizon, short-term forecasts exhibit evidence of destabi-
lizing behavior whereas long-term forecasts show stabilizing evidence.
7
 Not surprisingly, running the unbiasedness test for the forward rate reveals strongly biased 
results as well.
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9
Here we use a mixed model to regress the exchange rate forecasts on an ex-
trapolative and a regressive term, since the former term covers well technical orien-
tated forecaster behavior, whereas a regressive term should display the way how 
fundamentalists form their expectations. Furthermore, this procedure fits well into the 
relevant literature for comparative purposes (e.g. Moosa and Shamsuddin, 2004).
Expectations formation: )()( 16 ttttet sssss ++= + 	 (3)
Systematic bias: )()( 166 tttttet ssssss ++= ++ 	 (4)
Equation (3) shows the expectation mechanism. The expected change of the 
exchange rate is regressed on an extrapolative term (s
 t – s t-1), which contains the 
previous one month change of the exchange rate. The second term on the right side 
of the equation displays the regressive formation ( s
 t – s  t). The latter one is based 
upon the difference between a fundamental equilibrium and the current exchange 
rate. To generate the fundamental variable we have chosen the well known relative 
PPP model and calculated corresponding rates upon PPI differences. In addition to 
that we would like to find out, whether the consensus relies too much on these ex-
pectations concepts on average. Doing so, we use again the expectation errors (see 
notes to equation 2) and follow the approach of Frankel and Froot (1987a, pp. 147-
150) in equation (4), regressing them on the expectations mechanisms.
The results in Table 4 show that the consensus is based upon a mixture of ex-
trapolative and regressive expectation, so both mechanisms seem to matter. More 
interestingly the results for equation (4) show that forecasters rely too much on re-
gressive expectations on average, whereas the same doesn’t hold in respect to the 
extrapolation of current trends. We can summarize that the participants of the ZEW 
panel rely too heavily on the concept of PPP when forming US-Dollar/Euro forecasts 
in some way.
3.3. Expectations of fundamentalists and technicians
In this section we run the same regressions for the separated groups as in sec-
tion 3.2. We would like to know, whether there are any differences in the way that 
groups form exchange rate expectations (indicator i separates the different groups).
Page 9 of 22
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
10
Expectations formation: )()( 1, 6 ttittiiiet sssss ++= + 	 (5)
Systematic bias: )()( 16, 6 ttittiitiet ssssss ++= ++ 	 (6)
Table 5 shows that the 	 i coefficient of equation (5) differs between the different 
groups. Technicians seem to rely most heavily on the extrapolative term and funda-
mentalists least, whereas intermediates take a position in between. On the other 
hand forming regressive expectations seems to be most important for fundamental-
ists, followed by intermediates and least important for technicians. Not surprisingly 
when we compare the biased coefficients in equation (6) fundamentalists rely signifi-
cantly too much on the regressive term but not on the extrapolative term. Contrary, 
technicians orientate on a smaller degree too much on the regressive term, but addi-
tionally, they seem to follow too much on trend extrapolation (here the statistical sig-
nificance is less obvious). Again intermediates find themselves between the other 
two groups with biased forecasts towards the regressive term.8
3.4. A threshold analysis of expectations
Following our last results we use a switching regression model with different re-
gimes in order to get deeper insights into the structures of US-Dollar/Euro forecast 
biases. We determine the absolute value of the regressive term as the transition 
variable (c t = | s  t – s  t|), set the number of regimes to two (r = 2) and choose the 
threshold level ( i) via a grid search method (see e.g. Franses and Dijk, 2000, p. 84). 
Function (I
 i [c t]) indicates the valid regime in time t. The expectations model (f r,i[•]) 
shows different parameters, depending on the regime and the group. We follow this 
approach to see, whether the group specific forecast biases differ between periods, 
where the US-Dollar/Euro shows large deviations from PPP and periods, where ex-
change rates are in line with the fundamental concept. Earlier research by Taylor et 
al. (2001) has in fact indicated that adjustment speed in real exchange rates towards 
PPP may change faster in periods of large deviations from PPP.
8
 To test whether expectation coefficients are statistically different between groups, t-tests 
are performed. Between fundamentalists and other groups all coefficients are significantly 
different, whereas this applies between technicians and intermediates only for the regressive 
term in equation (5).
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Table 6 represents the corresponding results and explains our procedure in de-
tail. Summarizing and focusing on the estimation results of equation (7), the group of 
fundamentalists forms regressive expectations in both regimes, whereas the extent in 
regime 1 is greater (periods of major exchange rate deviations from PPP). This could 
contribute to stabilization in exchange rates and the utility of PPP. Additionally fun-
damentalists rely on trend extrapolation, but only in regime 2 (periods of minor ex-
change rate deviations from PPP). Contrary, technicians show a mix of regressive 
and extrapolative formation in both regimes. Further and looking at the parameter 
estimations of equation (8), all groups show a regressive bias in regime 1 but not in 
regime 2.9 Finally we reveal also an extrapolative bias in the expectation formation of 
technicians but only for regime 1, while fundamentalists still do not show any adher-
ence on an extrapolative bias. These results on forecasting bias may cause some 
worries: they indicate that expectations about mean reversion in exchange rates to-
wards PPP might appear too optimistic; moreover, some professionals – the techni-
cians – seem to form even extrapolative expectations to an unjustified degree and 
might consequently destabilize the market.
3.5. Performance of expectations
Our last analyses examine the forecast ability of the separated groups. Addi-
tionally we deal with related forward rates and random walk forecasts. The results are 
shown in Table 7 and include four accuracy tests applied to corresponding point 
forecasts and a hit rate (share of right direction forecasts) applied to underlying trend 
forecasts.
To cut a story short, one can not detect significant differences in the perform-
ance between fundamentalists, intermediates and technicians. However, if we con-
9
 The different behavior of the bias depending on the currently valid regime approves, that in conven-
tional regressions the bias varies over time (see, Frankel and Froot, 1987a, p. 150).
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centrate on the analysis for point forecasts such as MAE (mean absolute error) and 
RMSE (root mean square error), the random walk beats all groups of forecaster as 
well as the forward rate, even though the latter one performs also better than the 
forecaster groups. On the other hand if we consider the hit rate, which is calculated 
upon underlying trend forecasts, that all groups perform significantly better than the 
random walk, whereas forecasts based on the forward rate are significantly worse 
than the random walk.10 In addition to that, corresponding differences between the 
forecaster groups and the forward rate are highly significant.11
Taken together, both groups, fundamentalists and technicians, perform upon 
point forecast measures significantly worse than the random walk, as well as the for-
ward rate. On the other hand, if we consider just the implicit trend forecasts, than 
these forecaster groups outperform the other forecast series. It definitely shows that 
participants of the ZEW survey have forecasting abilities despite all kinds of biases 
revealed (see also Wakita, 1989). If they would be able to avoid systematic distor-
tions there would be an even better chance to forecast. This result stands in line with 
Elliott and Ito (1999, p. 455), "that more is going on in the models of the respondents 
than static expectations with random noise".
4. Conclusions
Our study on exchange rate expectations intends to bring fresh evidence into an 
established field. Thus, we first reproduce the stylized fact of non-rational expectation 
formation and conclude that our participants do not differ in this respect from those of 
earlier survey studies. We also notice – largely in line with the literature – that fore-
casts are biased, in particular that the sign of the bias does change over time. Our 
objective is, however, not just to perform the conventional tests for another survey at 
another time. We rather aim for adding a completely different and most interesting 
kind of information to the field in order to understand biased forecasts better: our sur-
vey is the first to combine a large data set of forecasts with information on the fore-
casters' preferred analytical instrument, e.g. their reliance on fundamental analysis.
10
 Note that the origin of the individual forecasts is of qualitative nature. Derived point fore-
casts are only used for comparative purposes.
11
 Performance statistics separated by PPP regimes show, that the groups perform better in 
regime 2. Moreover, if we pull up the hit rate, their out performance to the forward rate will 
get even bigger.
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We reveal that the preference of fundamental analysis is useful information to 
understand the way how exchange rate expectations are formed. Moreover, we de-
tect that the preference of fundamental analysis helps to understand specific biases: 
fundamentalists believe too much in mean reversion of the US-Dollar/Euro, more 
than other participants. So, this misguided belief is consistent with poor forecasting 
performance. However, any claim of superior performance due to reliance on techni-
cal analysis is premature. Although the technicians' expectations are less distorted by 
too much reliance on PPP, they also show a misguided belief: they extrapolate short-
term trends as one would assume, yet, they extrapolate too much. Consequently, this 
additional expectation distortion hinders them to form appropriate forecasts.
Overall, we argue that our data provide new evidence on possible sources of 
systematic forecasting biases. In addition to Ito's (1990) discovery of wishful thinking 
we reveal too much belief in mean reversion which can be interpreted usefully as too 
much belief in PPP. One ought to speculate whether Ito's and our detections may be 
connected to behavioural distortion in decision making: in this sense, our participants 
possibly overestimate the precision of their knowledge of exchange rate changes  
relying too much on their interpretation of PPP. However, there is also a competing 
explanation for fully rational forecasters, who show proper understanding of funda-
mentals: as we are covering professionals with somewhat long-term orientation, mar-
kets might act inconsistent to them. Then, foreign exchange markets are possibly 
dominated by short-term considerations which are less consistent with the directions 
that fundamentals advise.
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FIGURE 1 US-Dollar/Euro realizations, PPP exchange rates and consensus forecasts 
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Note:
This figure shows actual realizations of the US-Dollar/Euro and US-Dollar/Deutsche Mark exchange 
rates, where the latter are transformed on the official exchange rate between the Deutsche Mark/Euro 
of 1.95583 (left scaled). In addition to that it shows PPP exchange rates, which are calculated upon the 
PPP concept (left scaled) and consensus change predictions (right scaled). The consensus data were 
generated with the quantification method introduced by Carlson and Parkin, 1975 (for further details see 
note in Table 1). To calculate the fundamental exchange rates we used the PPP concept (further ex-
planations are given in chapter regressive expectations). Whereas the US-Dollar/Euro as well as the 
PPP exchange rates are presented in their levels (corresponding left axis), the consensus data are 
shown in their changes (corresponding right axis). It can be seen, that the swap of the consensus fore-
casts from an appreciation of the US-Dollar/Euro to a depreciation occurred around the same time, 
when the US-Dollar/Euro crossed the line of the PPP exchange rates. Furthermore the amplitudes 
show a similar pattern, at least in their peaks.
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TABLE 1. Statistics of consensus forecasts, forward rates and exchange rates
Consensus forecasts Forward rates Exchange rates
e
tS 6+
e
ts 6+
f
tS 6+
f
ts 6+ 6+tS 6+ ts
Mean 1.1169 -0.0141 1.1297 0.0006 1.1294 0.0033
Variance 0.0120 0.0037 0.0224 0.0006 0.0221 0.0052
SD 0.1094 0.0604 0.1497 0.0249 0.1487 0.0709
Min. 0.8808 -0.1470 0.8464 -0.0604 0.8510 -0.1304
Max. 1.3282 0.1312 1.4358 0.0292 1.4120 0.1828
Note:
Using the method f Carlson and Parkin (1975) to derive aggregate point expectations requires two 
assumptions. First, each individual forecast is based upon a subjective probability distribution concern-
ing the outcome of this forecast. However, applying the logistic distribution did not yield the results in 
any qualitatively different way. Second, the corresponding means of the individual probability distribu-
tions follow-up a normal distribution, which can be justified with the Central Limit Theorem. Further-
more we have to set a scaling factor, which displays the threshold, of which the forecasters perceive 
noticeable changes in the exchange rate. We choose a symmetric scaling factor of three percent. In a 
special survey the participants of the ZEW Financial Market Survey were asked to reveal their individ-
ual thresholds in correspondenc  to their different forecasts. The average median for the US-
Dollar/Deutsche Mark was a symmetric threshold of roughly three percent. Nevertheless, choosing 
other thresholds around three percent, didn’t show any qualitatively different results. Taylor (1989) 
also uses the normal distribution and sets his scaling factor on 2.5 per cent. Other methods like choos-
ing the threshold that the mean expected change is equal to the mean actual change or that squared 
prediction errors are minimized seem inappropriate because of overwhelming evidence towards irra-
tional and inaccurate exchange rate expectations. Finally, in order to rescue some data points, in 
cases where the probability of a category is zero, we used neighboring estimated volatilities to com-
pute the forecast (Carlson and Parkin, 1975, p. 130-131).
S e is defined as the (consensus) forecast of the US-Dollar/ Euro, whereas s e represents the 
         percentage change forecast of the US-Dollar/ Euro.
S f is defined as the implicit forecast of the US-Dollar/ Euro based upon the 6 month LIBOR rate   
         difference and s f represents the corresponding change forecast in percentage.
S      is defined as the US-Dollar/ Euro and stt+6 represents the percentage change of the US-
         Dollar/ Euro from t to t+6.
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TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics of the numbers of participants divided by groups 
Fundamentalists Intermediates Technicians
Group criteria: 
Fundamental 
analysis    X
X   80 80 < X > 40 X   40
Mean 35 80 38
Min. 12 9 8
Max. 57 122 58
Note:
All measurements are based upon a quantity of people. The statistics are calculated on the ZEW sur-
veys from 12.1991 to 04.2004. Accordingly the number 35 that corresponds to the combination "Mean" 
and "Fundamentalists" represents the average number of people amongst all surveys, who use fun-
damental analysis to a degree of 80 or more per cent. Furthermore the combination "Max." and 
"Technicians" shows 58 and implies the maximum number of technicians in one survey. Concerning 
the participants in the survey, whom we categorized as technicians, their mean of technical analysis 
adds up to 52 per cent (considering the mean of the whole survey is 30 per cent) whereas they use 17 
per cent on flow analysis on average (the corresponding overall mean is 10 per cent). In fact we are 
dealing with 237 individuals as not all participants of the ZEW survey responded to our questionnaire.
TABLE 3. Testing rational expectations: Unbiasedness and efficiency tests
Test of unbiasedness: ett ss 66 ++ +=  (1)
Test of efficiency: 666 +++ += ttet FDss  (2)
 t: 0=  t: 0= DF adj. R2 F-test
1,0 == 
6+ ts 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.07 147 -0.01 19.86***
66 ++  t
e
t ss 1.79*** 3.73 0.02 1.35 147 0.23 -
Note:
Here, as in the following tables of this paper (except for Table 7), all variables are calculated in 
natural logarithmic form so that their differences represent corresponding changes:
st+6       is defined as the difference between the current Euro/US-Dollar rate (Deutsche Mark/
              US-Dollar-) and their prior six month rate.
se         is defined as the difference between the expected Euro/US-Dollar consensus rate 
              (Deutsche Mark/US-Dollar-) and their subsequent actual realization.
FD         is defined as the forward discount of the Euro/US-Dollar (Deutsche Mark/US-Dollar),  
               calculated upon the difference of 6 month Libor rates.
All regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard-errors (see, Newey and West, 1987). 
Asterisks refer to the level of significance: *: ten per cent, **: five per cent, ***: one per cent.
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TABLE 4. Hybrid model for consensus expectations
Expectations formation: )()( 16 ttttet sssss ++= + 	 (3)
Systematic bias: )()( 166 tttttet ssssss ++= ++ 	 (4)
	 t: 0=	  t: 0=  t: 0= adj. R2
e
ts 6+ 0.38*** 3.81 0.35*** 10.25 0.00 0.72 0.68
66 ++  t
e
t ss 0.34 1.26 0.26*** 2.96 0.01 0.56 0.16
Note:
The extrapolative term represents the previous one month change of the Euro/US-Dollar rate. Longer 
periods e.g. 3 months or 6 months changes show less significant results therefore we use the one 
month changes. The equilibrium rate of the foreign exchange rate is based upon the relative PPP con-
cept. Corresponding rates are calculated upon PPI differences between the Euro area and the USA. 
The use of CPI data could not reveal qualitatively different results. In addition to that robustness 
checkups show that the parameters indeed vary over time. Specifically we separated by equal time 
periods, up and down periods of the exchange rate as well as over- and undervaluation periods upon 
the PPP concept. However, in the majority of cases their signs remain equal. 
TABLE 5. Hybrid model for group expectations
Expectations formation: )()( 1, 6 ttittiiet sssss ++= + 	 (5)
Systematic bias: )()( 16, 6 ttittitiet ssssss ++= ++ 	 (6)
i	 t: 0=i	 i t: 0=i i t: 0=i adj. R2
1,
6
e
ts + 0.14 0.58 0.46*** 6.18 0.00 -0.54 0.59Funda-
mentalists 6, 6 ++  tiet ss 0.12 0.35 0.37*** 3.31 0.00 -0.02 0.23
2,
6
e
ts + 0.63** 2.33 0.42*** 5.13 0.01 1.26 0.40Inter-
mediates 62, 6 ++  tet ss 0.58 1.54 0.33*** 3.14 0.02 1.00 0.17
3,
6
e
ts + 0.64*** 3.32 0.40*** 6.73 0.02** 2.16 0.45Tech-
nicians 63, 6 ++  tet ss 0.59* 1.79 0.31*** 3.06 0.02 1.38 0.16
Note:
The extrapolative term as well as the regressive one is calculated in the same way as showed in 
section 3.2. As well as in above calculations we carried out robustness checks. Eventually the results 
appeared qualitatively very much alike. It is worth pointing out, that above all the differences between 
fundamentalists and technicians approved according to corresponding conclusions in this chapter.
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TABLE 6. Hybrid model for group expectations with thresholds
Expectations formation: ])[1()(][)(
,2,1
,
6
i
ti
i
ti
ie
t cIfcIfs •+•= + (7)
Systematic bias: ])[1()(][)(
,2,16
,
6
i
ti
i
tit
ie
t cIfcIfss •+•= ++ (8)
with  )()()( 1 ttirttirirr ssssf ++=•  	 and 2,1=r
with  || ttit ssc = and  )( itcI 0
1
=
=
i
tt
i
tt
ssif
ssif


<

||,
||,
r
i
r
	 t: 0=i
r
	 i
r
 t: 0=i
r
 i
r
 t: 0=i
r
 adj. R2
1 0.06 0.16 0.46*** 5.95 0.00 -0.15 0.60
1,
6
e
ts + 2 0.29** 2.22 0.37** 2.45 -0.01 -1.12 0.32
1 0.30 0.73 0.39*** 3.42 0.00 -0.16 0.30
Funda-
mentalists
6
1,
6 ++  t
e
t ss
2 -0.15 -0.48 0.20 0.47 0.00 0.21 -0.02
1 0.70* 1.75 0.40*** 5.01 0.03* 1.91 0.39
2,
6
e
ts + 2 0.51** 2.48 0.47** 2.29 -0.01 -0.72 0.31
1 0.92** 2.03 0.33*** 3.24 0.03 1.20 0.21
Inter-
mediates
6
2,
6 ++  t
e
t ss
2 0.06 0.16 0.24 0.53 0.00 0.19 -0.01
1 0.67** 2.48 0.38*** 6.41 0.03** 2.58 0.43
3,
6
e
ts + 2 0.60*** 3.62 0.41*** 2.71 0.00 -0.01 0.40
1 0.87** 2.25 0.31*** 3.12 0.03 1.34 0.19
Tech-
nicians
6
3,
6 ++  t
e
t ss
2 0.17 0.52 0.23 0.55 0.01 0.64 -0.01
Note:
Regime one represents the periods, when the Euro/US-Dollar deviates ten percent or more from his 
fundamentally fair value based upon the relative PPP theory. Regime two therefore represents the 
periods, when the realized exchange rates deviate less than ten percent from PPP exchange rates. 
The indicator function I(ct) shows in which regime exchange rates are currently located. Concerning 
the grid search method, we restrict the search for the threshold in a range of 2.5 – 25.0 per cent (with 
intervals of 2.5 per cent in between). Additionally we require that the number of observations in each 
of the regimes contains 30 per cent at minimum. Finally, the threshold is selected, if the overall resid-
ual sum of squares is minimized. Alternatively, setting wider threshold ranges results in slightly differ-
ent thresholds between the separated groups; however, the outcomes do not show any qualitative 
changes.
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TABLE 7. Tests of accuracy and quality of performance
ME MAE RMSE Theil’s U Hit rate
Fundamentalists -0.0157 0.0964 0.1226 1.5367 0.6154***
Intermediates -0.0319 0.0974 0.1246 1.5613 0.5946**
Technicians -0.0392* 0.0956 0.1247 1.5681 0.5959**
Forward rate -0.0006 0.0746 0.0912 1.1455 0.3289***
Random Walk -0.0010 0.0656 0.0796 - -
Note:
Random walk forecasts are calculated on current exchange rates, respectively no change forecast.
ME           represents the mean error based on Euro/US-Dollar forecasts and realized exchange rates.
MAE         represents corresponding absolute mean error.
RMSE      represents corresponding root mean square error. Differences between groups and other 
                 forecast series were examined upon 
Theil’s U   represents the relation between the group specific RMSE and the RMSE of the random 
                 walk. Prob. shows the p-value for statistical significance.
Hit rate     represents the share of right direction forecasts. In brackets you find the p-values of the
                 chi-square test statistic in correspondence to the hypothesis of no directional forecast ability 
                (Diebold and Lopez, 1996, pp. 256-258). Differences between the forecast series were
                 tested upon contingency tables in connection with 2-tests.
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